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Loffi et al.: Seeing the Threat: Pilot Visual Detection of sUAS in VMC

The newswire is rife with anecdotes of near misses between UAS platforms
and manned aircraft, even in the tentative state of UAS integration efforts. In
March 2013, a B-777 operated by Alitalia Flight AZ608 came within 200 feet of
colliding with a small multi-bladed unmanned aircraft on approach to John F.
Kennedy International Airport. Just over a year later, U.S. Airways CRJ-200
passenger jet bound from Charlotte, North Carolina had a similar encounter with a
small remotely piloted, fixed-wing UAS platform on approach to its Tallahassee,
Florida destination (Botelho, 2014). On September 17, 2014, an NYPD helicopter
came within 50 feet of colliding with a small drone, requiring the pilot to perform
an evasive maneuver (“NYPD,” 2014). Even small, general aviation aircraft have
encountered near misses with unmanned platforms. In September 2014, a Cessna
172 sighted an unmanned aircraft passing within 100 feet below his flight altitude
near Orlando-Sanford Airport (Whitlock, 2014). In the same month, a Piper Archer
pilot reportedly passed within 50-100 feet from a UAS, claiming “the thing [UAS]
flashed right off my wingtip” (Whitlock, 2014). Just days prior, a Cessna 172
piloted by a flight instructor reported an illuminated drone overflying his aircraft
by 200 feet, remarking “it came out of seemingly nowhere” (Whitlock, 2014, p. 1).
As unmanned systems proliferated the commercial and hobby markets, pilot reports
of encounters and near misses have substantially increased in both frequency and
risk. Between November 2014 and January 2016, the FAA recorded 1,346 pilot
sightings and near-misses of UAS platforms—nearly 100 per month (Federal
Aviation Administration [FAA], 2016c). The sheer quantity of UAS encounter
sightings highlights a clear, ongoing problem.
Problem
The threat of midair collision between unmanned and manned aircraft
represents an unknown risk of integrating operations between these two disparate
NAS users. Until such benchmarks are established for electronic Detect, Sense &
Avoid Systems, pilots must rely on visual means to ensure positive separation from
UAS platforms. Previous research is inconclusive about the effectiveness of this
method of UAS-aircraft separation.
UAS Encounter Studies
A recent study by Gettinger and Michel (2015) analyzed 921 UAS incidents
involving UAS platforms and manned aircraft. The study revealed several findings,
including:
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58.8% (n = 391) of UAS encounters occurred near airports where
UAS operations are prohibited
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90.2% (n = 708) of UAS encounters occurred above 400 feet
AGL, the maximum allowable altitude for most UAS platforms
In 21.2% (n = 51) of the reported cases, the UAS platform passed
within 50 feet or less of the manned aircraft
In 8.6% (n = 28) of reported UAS close encounters, pilots took
evasive action or maneuvered to avoid a perceived potential
collision

Additionally, Gettinger and Michel (2015) noted that close encounters with UAS
platforms occurred at disproportionately higher rates around areas of high-density
air traffic, such as major airports. Close encounters were defined as occurring when
a controller or pilot spotted a drone flying near the flight path of a manned aircraft,
but did not pose a collision threat (Gettinger & Michel, 2015). Between December
2014 and August 2015, pilots on final approach to Los Angeles International
Airport reported 17 separate close encounters with UAS platforms (Gettinger &
Michel, 2015).
The Academy of Model Aeronautics (AMA) conducted a similar analysis
of UAS sightings, based on 1,346 FAA reports of UAS encounters that occurred
between August 2015 and January 2016 (Academy of Model Aeronautics [AMA],
2016). The AMA’s (2016) report concluded that 3.3% (n = 19) of UAS encounters
represented “close calls” or “near misses”; that vast majority of UAS reports should
be more accurately presented as “UAS sightings” (AMA, 2016, p. 1) Moreover, the
AMA highlighted a disjointed relationship between the recent sales of UAS
platforms and UAS encounter reports submitted to the FAA. While UAS sales have
dramatically increased--estimated at more than a million UAS platforms around the
2015 Christmas season alone—reported UAS sightings have been in a steady
decline since August 2015 (AMA, 2016). The AMA further identified that several
reports contained references to non-UAS objects such as balloons, birds, rockets,
or other non-relevant flying objects (AMA, 2016). In assessing the release of UAS
encounter data, the AMA concluded that 3.4% (n = 46) reports could accurately be
characterized as near collisions. In the report, the AMA argues that these lower,
revised statistics are more accurate since these 46 reports contained textual
notations of a “near mid-air collision, near miss, or near collision” (AMA, 2016, p.
2). The AMA analysis identified that 1.8% of reported cases (n = 24) required the
pilot of the manned aircraft to take evasive action (AMA, 2016).
It is important to note that data in both the AMA (2016) and Gettinger &
Michel (2015) studies were based solely on the manned aircraft pilot’s perceived
distance from the encountered UAS platform. This represented a significant
limitation, substantiated by an FAA representative who stated: “Since the majority
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of the pilot reports can’t be verified – the drones typically don’t show up on radar
nor is the operator identified – we can’t say for certain what the actual separation
distance was…” (AMA, 2016, p. 3).
The number of cases of near mid-air collisions with UAS platforms should
be cause for concern, as it is highly likely the number of mid-air collisions with
UAS platforms will rise in relationship to the population of UAS platforms
operating in the National Airspace System. To provide some context to these
statistics, the FAA reported 461 near mid-air collisions between manned aircraft
for the five-year period encompassing 2009-2013—about 92 incidences per year
(FAA, 2016b). Using the AMA’s most conservative assessment of near mid-air
collisions between unmanned and manned aircraft, 46 incidences occurred in the
15 months of FAA-reported data. This represents a UAS near mid-air collision rate
of almost 37 incidents per year. While currently below the manned aircraft average,
this statistic fails to account for the expected dramatic growth of UAS platforms in
the upcoming years. In its 20-year Aerospace Forecast, the FAA estimates that
unmanned aircraft will top 7 million platforms by 2020 (FAA, 2016a). This
expected growth in the number of UAS platforms and operators will likely cause
near mid-air collisions between unmanned platforms and manned aircraft to rise.
Visibility Studies
In 2008, researchers from Ohio University conducted an experimental
visibility study designed to determine air traffic detection ranges for inexperienced
pilots and simultaneously test if UAV camera systems could provide similar
detection performance. The experiment used a Piper Saratoga as the manned testing
aircraft and a Piper Warrior as a simulated UAS. An observer pilot [test subject]
was instructed to locate and mark terrain features on a map to simulate normal
pilotage workload, while simultaneously recording sighted air traffic. Seven test
subjects were presented two aircraft encounters with the simulated UAS craft—one
head-on encounter and one 90 degree crossing encounter. The UAS craft was flown
at a vertically de-conflicted altitude 500 feet below the manned aircraft. The
average detection range for the test subjects was 1.275 statute miles; the mean
detection range for the 90-degree intercept was slightly further at a mean of 1.511
statute miles compared to 1.038 statute miles for the head-on intercept condition.
The camera system experienced a significantly longer mean detection time of 0.417
statute miles. The authors note the small sample size of this study may affect the
reliability of the presented conclusions.
In September 2015, the Colorado Aviation Association conducted a drone
visibility study for agricultural aircraft. The goal of the test was to determine if low-
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flying agricultural application aircraft pilots could see a UAS craft and have
adequate time to perform an avoidance maneuver (CAAA, 2015). The test utilized
five volunteer pilots flying over five fields with Agribotix Enduro [Rotorcraft]
sUAS platforms. Two of the five fields contained the UAS craft, two contained
large marked orange tarps, and the fifth field remained empty (CAAA, 2015).
Presumably, the orange tarps were placed to test the viability of using a visible
marker to highlight the presence of UAS operations. In test fields containing the
UAS, the UAS platform was flown at a lower altitude than the manned aircraft.
Four manned agricultural aircraft and one helicopter was used for the test (CAAA,
2015). Pilots of the manned aircraft only located one of the UAS craft from the
available eight passes (CAAA, 2015). The manned helicopter was not able to
initially locate the UAS craft during moving flight, but was able to locate both craft
while in stationary hover (CAAA, 2015). Colorado Agricultural Aviation
Association Board President Sam Rogge highlighted the test’s findings stating
(CAAA, 2015):
What I heard from a majority of the pilots was what we knew: UAVs
would be difficult to see, but it turns out they’re more difficult to see than
we thought. It’s clear that it will take a cultural change on both our parts
[ag aviators and UAS operators] if we’re going to work cooperatively in
the airspace…operating line of sight isn’t enough to mitigate safety issues.
(p. 1)
Agribotix (n.d.), the company furnishing the UAS platforms for the test
provided several conclusions, based on the test’s results:







“See and avoid is a terrible strategy for keeping low-altitude airspace
safe” (p. 1). Experiment participants reiterated the importance of coming
up with a solution to avoid simultaneous use of airspace by both manned
and unmanned aircraft.
“Audible warning of a crop duster’s approach is also a terrible strategy”
(p. 1). Ground test participants indicated they could visually see the
manned agricultural aircraft long before they could hear them.
“Communication is key” (p. 1). Agribotix recommends use of digital
software products, such as those produced by AirMap, which allows
airspace users to “declare in advance their zones of operation.” (p. 1)
“Technology might help” (p. 1). Technology such as ADS-B may help,
but could prove costly.
“Ground markers are an OK backstop” (p. 1). Ground markers, such as
the marked tarps used during the test can be effective, but should not be
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the primary method for altering manned aircraft to the presence of UAS
operations.
Human Factors Considerations
Visual Detection Challenges. The FAA’s (2016b) AC 90-48D cites several
human factors challenges associated with visual aircraft detection:
Refocus. A featureless sky can result in the eyes focusing on a natural,
relaxed focal distance of 10-30 feet, which potentially reduces aircraft detection.
Regularly refocusing or glancing can help to reduce this natural human tendency.
Refocus after switching views. The eyes require several seconds to refocus
when changing views from inside and outside the aircraft.
Eye movements. Scanning visual areas in short, 10-degree arcs is the most
effective method for visual aircraft detection.
Spotting threats. Relative motion through peripheral vision is usually the
first indication of a potential collision. Peripheral vision is most prominent when
the eyes are refocusing. Aircraft on a direct collision course, however, often display
no relative motion. The only visible indication of a collision is the increasing size
of the object over time.
Physical obstructions. Visual obstructions in the cockpit such as the
instrument console and aircraft structure may require a pilot to physically maneuver
the head to see the obstructed area.
Assistance & additional equipment. The FAA recommends pilots enlist the
aid of other crew or passengers in visually detecting hazards, particularly in trafficdense airspace or during operations that involve elevated risk.
Nighttime searches. Nighttime detection of collision threats can be
particularly challenging due to the lack of object brightness, poor color contrast,
and need to discern between airborne and ground lighting. Nighttime searches rely
almost exclusively on peripheral vision due to positioning of the natural night blind
spot. Off-center viewing can enhance night visual detection.
Detection and Reaction Time. According to AC 90-48D (FAA, 2016b),
“Research has shown that the average person has a reaction time of 12.5 seconds.
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This means that a small or high-speed object could pose a serious threat…This is
particularly important with small Unmanned Aircraft Systems” (p. 2).
As presented by Table 1, pilots require a minimum of 6.1 seconds to
effectively visually detect, recognize, and predict a craft’s convergence collision
potential (FAA, 2016b). An additional 6.4 seconds is required to adequately assess,
select, and execute an appropriate evasive maneuver to avoid a converging craft
(FAA, 2016b). The reduced size of UAS platforms compared to manned aircraft-particularly small UAS (sUAS) platforms with limited visual cross-sections--may
make visual detection exceedingly difficult, reducing a pilot’s ability to react to a
converging threat in time.
Table 1
Aircraft Identification and Reaction Time Chart
Event
See Object
Recognize Aircraft
Become Aware of Collision Course
Decision to Turn Left or Right
Muscular Reaction
Aircraft Lag Time
TOTAL
(FAA, 2016b, p. 2)

Seconds
0.1
1.0
5.0
4.0
0.4
2.0
12.5

Purpose
The purpose of this study was to establish a predictive UAS platform
visibility model for general aviation pilots operating under visual meteorological
conditions. Such benchmarks could be subsequently applied to determine the
adequacy of visual means for UAS detection, identification, potential collision
recognition, and evasive response decision-making.
Existing research is lacks adequate data to model UAS encounters with
general aviation aircraft. The Kephart and Braasch (2008) study contained only
limited data points and utilized a simulated UAV that does not adequately represent
the size and configuration of UAS craft currently operating in the NAS. Similarly
the CAAA (2015) study applies primarily to agricultural operations and the
experimental design does not adequately emulate the type of flying conditions
experienced by general aviation pilots. The study sought to discover answers to the
following research questions:
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1.

What is the mean distance in which an aware pilot can reliably
visually detect a converging sUAS platform under visual
meteorological conditions?
2. Is there a substantial difference in detectability of fixed-wing vs.
quadcopter UAS platforms?
3. Is there variability between a pilot’s perceived visual distance from a
UAS and their actual distance?
4. Based on the FAA’s model for Aircraft Identification & Reaction
Time, would pilots have adequate time to evade a UAS collision?
Method
This study utilized a mixed-method research design. Twenty experimental
participants were recruited from among a population of flight students at a part 141
collegiate flight program in the Midwestern United States using purposeful
sampling. Patton (2015) describes purposeful sampling as “strategically selecting
information-rich cases to study, cases that by their nature and substance will
illuminate the inquiry question being investigated” (p. 265). Participants were
assigned flight times from 1000 through 1400 [local] during peak daylight time.
Four experimental sorties were flown each testing day. The same manned aircraft,
a Cessna 172S G1000 general aviation aircraft, was used for these flights to ensure
consistency. Sorties were each flown with two pilots: one served as the
experimental subject and the other was a non-participating safety pilot. An
additional safety observer accompanied each experimental sortie and assisted in
recording pertinent data relative to the mission, such as time stamps and
coordinated each intercept pass. The safety observer also recorded participant
comments and made qualitative observations which were analyzed for trends
following the experiment execution.
Experimental participants were instructed to visually detect a small UAS
craft flying on an altitude de-conflicted intercept course with the aircraft in a
protected airspace area. The UAS craft were launched and controlled from
ground operators located at a local RC flying field, and operated under an existing
333 exemption and Certificate of Authorization (COA) for the airspace. The
sUAS craft were positioned in proximity to the manned aircraft’s assigned course.
Subject pilots flew along an assigned intercept axis, bisecting the UAS operations
area, during which each scenario was presented. Each pair of participants
encountered the same group of six scripted scenarios, which included:
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Intercept 2: Hovering quadcopter UAS on port side of aircraft
course
Intercept 3: Hovering quadcopter UAS on starboard side of aircraft
course
Intercept 4: Quadcopter UAS transitioning from port to starboard
side
Intercept 5: Quadcopter UAS transitioning from starboard to port
side
Intercept 6: Fixed-wing UAS orbiting on head-on aspect relative to
aircraft course

Table 2
Participant Aeronautical Demographics
Flight

Age
FAA Pilot Certificate(s)
Medical
Reported
Vision
Bracket
Certificate
Vision
Correction
1
60-65
ATP
2nd Class
20/20
Corrected
2
20-25
CFI/MEI
1st Class
Unknown
Unknown
3
20-25
CFI/MEI
1st Class
20/20
Corrected
4
<20
PPL w/ IR
1st Class
20/20
Corrected
5
20-25
CPL
1st Class
20/20
Uncorrected
6
<20
PPL
3rd Class
20/20
Corrected
7
20-25
CFI/CFII
1st Class
20/20
Uncorrected
8
20-25
ATP
1st Class
20/20
Corrected
9
20-25
CPL
2nd Class
20/20
Uncorrected
10
20-25
PPL w/ IR
3rd Class
22/20
Corrected
11
20-25
CPL
2nd Class
Unknown
Unknown
12
20-25
CFI/CFII
1st Class
20/20
Uncorrected
13
20-25
ATP
1st Class
20/20
Uncorrected
14
20-25
CFI
3rd Class
20/20
Uncorrected
15
20-25
CFI/CFII
3rd Class
20/20
Uncorrected
16
20-25
CPL
1st Class
Unknown
Unknown
17
20-25
PPL w/ IR
3rd Class
20/20
Corrected
18
20-25
CPL
3rd Class
20/20
Uncorrected
19
25-30
CFI/CFII/MEI
1st Class
20/20
Corrected
20
20-25
CFI/CFII
1st Class
20/20
Uncorrected
Note: (PPL = Private Pilot License; IR = Instrument Rating; CPL = Commercial Pilot license; CFI
= Certified Flight Instructor; CFII = Certified Flight Instructor-Instrument; MEI = Multi-Engine
Instructor; ATP = Airline Transport Pilot). All commercial pilots and above were instrument rated.
Vision correction indicates if participant medical certificate required wear of corrective lenses.

If participants visually identified a UAS during the intercept, they were
asked to estimate the distance between the aircraft and UAS platform, as well as
verbally select an escape or avoidance maneuver.
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For the scenarios, the researchers used a 3D Robotics Iris for the quadcopter
UAS. The Iris’ dimensions measure 1.8 feet by 1.8 feet, from motor to motor
[excluding propeller width](Kike, 2015). The craft was colored white for maximum
ground contrast and visibility, and to simulate the color of the majority of
quadcopters currently operating in the NAS.
An RMRC Anaconda was used for the fixed-wing UAS craft. The
Anaconda has a length of 4.62 feet, has a wingspan of 6.75 feet, and is primarily
composed of hardened Styrofoam (Ready Made Remote Control, 2016). The craft
was colored white for maximum ground contrast and visibility.

Figure 1. Anaconda Fixed-Wing UAS (left). Iris Quadcopter UAS (right). During the experiment,
the Iris was colored white to increase visibility.

Geolocation information from both sets of UAS craft was recorded using
the Mission Planner Software suite. Manned aircraft geolocation information was
collected by extracting recorded GPS coordinates from the G-1000 avionics suite.
Experiment participants were instructed to verbally indicate when they visually
located each UAS craft. A safety observer flew on each sortie and was responsible
for recording and timestamping each successful sighting. Visual distance
information was derived by extracting geolocation coordinates, from both the
manned aircraft and UAS platforms and subsequently correlating the sighting time.
Both sets of coordinates were then input into Google Maps to derive visual distance
information. It is important to note that the reported distance information represents
only lateral distance, irrespective of altitude differences: it does not account for the
increased slant range between the aircraft and UAS platforms.
The manned aircraft was equipped with a small, externally-mounted GoPro
Electro-Optical video camera during select sorties. The camera was not included
on all sorties due to technical and operational limitations. Select images were
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extracted and presented in the findings to provide readers a visual representation of
the visual conditions of the experiment.
To ensure safety during the experiment, the researchers equipped both UAS
platforms with a proprietary, miniaturized ADS-B device developed by uAvionix.
The portable equipment allowed the safety observer in the aircraft to monitor the
true position of the UAS platforms in near real-time on a tablet device and alert the
crew to a real-world collision threat.

Figure 2. uAvionix proprietary ADS-B device installed on UAS (left) and aircraft (right). (Used
with permission)

Limitations
The experiment was conducted in accordance with the established plan with
minor caveats:






Experiment measured only the lateral distances between manned and
unmanned aircraft encounters.
Due to an experiment execution error, intercept 3 was consistently but
incorrectly conducted on the port side of the aircraft course
Flight 8, Intercepts 1-5 were intended to be flown using the Iris
Quadcopter, however, the UAS platform malfunctioned. As a result, the
fixed-wing Anaconda UAS platform was used for these intercepts. Data
collected during these intercepts was removed from statistical calculations
when appropriate to avoid compromising study validity.
The Anaconda UAS encountered a malfunction during Flight 9, Intercept
6. As a result, an alternate fixed-wing Sky Surfer platform was used for
this intercept. No telemetry data was collected during this intercept.

https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol3/iss3/13
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Findings & Discussion
The experiment was conducted during periods of visual meteorological
conditions between July 7 and July 18, 2016. Researchers collected data for 119
intercepts among the 20 experimental flights. Flight time for all experimental
flights totaled 13.0 hours.
Detectability
Overall, the UAS craft were detected on 40.3% (n = 48) of the intercepts.
No participants reported a false-positive sighting of a UAS platform during the first
control intercept. The Iris quadcopter was detected during 36.8% of the possible
intercepts (n = 28) and the Anaconda fixed-wing platform was detected during
87.0% (n = 20) of the possible intercepts. A summary of UAS detection findings
by intercept are presented in table 3: detailed findings are presented in table 4.
Table 3
Summary Statistics: Detection Ranges by UAS Platform & Intercept
UAS Type / Intercept #
2
3
4
5
Iris (Quadcopter)
Mean
0.053
0.092
0.026
0.028
Median
0
0.07
0
0
Mode
0
0
0
0
Detection Rate
36.8%
57.9%
26.3%
26.3%
Anaconda (Fixed-Wing)
Mean
Median
Mode
Detection Rate
Note: All ranges in statute miles (SM). Zero figures indicate the UAS was not detected.

6

0.493
0.45
0
84.2%

Detection Range
The detection range for the Iris and Anaconda UAS platforms varied
considerably. As shown in Table 3, the mean detection range for the Iris quadcopter
was consistently less than 0.10 statute miles (SM), with the furthest detection
occurring at 0.31 SM. Conversely, the mean Anaconda UAS detection range was
0.49 SM, with the furthest detection occurring at 1.36 SM. To provide perspective
on this finding, W.D. Howell (as cited in Watson, Ramirez, and Salud, 2009),
conducted a 1957 field study that analyzed pilot detection range to a converging
manned DC-3 aircraft. Howell determined the detection range varied from 5.5 km
[3.4 SM] to 8.7 km [5.4 SM]. Similarly, the Kephart and Braasch (2008) study
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revealed mean detection range to the much smaller manned Piper Warrior aircraft
was 1.275 SM.
This initial finding was not necessarily unexpected, as the Anaconda’s
visible wing surface area was a relatively large visible target of 5.27 ft2, vs. the Iris’
small 3.24 ft2 visible surface dimension. It is possible, however, that this visibility
finding could be confounded by the intercept type and aspect angle relative to the
manned aircraft.
0.25
0.2
0.2
0.15
0.075
0.065
0.1 0.05
0.05 0
0

0.055

0.045
0.035
0

0.045

0

00

0
-0.05

0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20

0.25

-0.05

Figure 3. Bubble Chart of Detection Distances by Intercept Type for Side Hover Iris,
Transitioning Iris, and Head-on Anaconda UAS profiles. Pilot detection distance for the side
hovering Iris is depicted on the x-axis; distance for transitioning Iris on the y-axis; and detection
distance for head-on Anaconda depicted by the relative size of plotted bubble point. All distances
presented in statute miles (SM).

A comparison was made in Figure 3 of the three types of intercepts by
aspect: side hovering Iris, transitioning Iris, and head-on orbiting Anaconda.
Participants showed generally poor success in detecting all three platforms.
Participants seemed to experience the most difficulty detecting the transitioning Iris
UAS. Participants who best detected the Anaconda UAS generally did not detect
the transitioning Iris until the UAS was in proximity to the aircraft.
This was a rather unexpected finding. Since peripheral vision is highly
sensitive to motion, a pilot who used the same scanning approach to detect the headon Anaconda UAS should have noticed the transitioning Iris in their peripheral
vision. Moreover, it also seems unlikely that a pilot would have better success
detecting the stationary, hovering Iris vs. the transitioning Iris; however, the data
suggest this counterintuitive result.
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Figure 4. Google Earth depiction of Flight 6, Intercept 5. Aircraft silhouette shows relative lateral
and vertical position of manned aircraft at time of visual encounter. Gray plots indicate relative
lateral and vertical telemetry of UAS. Red plots indicate path of aircraft pre-sighting: Green plots
show path of aircraft post-sighting. Plot length varies between 1-3 second intervals.

A Google Earth map showing the telemetry of the aircraft relative to the
UAS is presented to show the relative visual aspect for the two most extreme
elements of the data. Figure 4 shows the closest encounter in which participants
were able to spot the Iris UAS, which occurred during Flight 6, Intercept 5.
Collected telemetry indicated the distance between the UAS and aircraft to be 0.06
SM.
Similarly, Figure 5 shows the furthest sighting of the Anaconda UAS, which
occurred during Flight 19, Intercept 6. Telemetry indicated the distance between
the UAS and aircraft to be 1.36 SM.
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Figure 5. Google Earth depiction of Flight 19, Intercept 6. Aircraft silhouette and gray UAS plot
shows relative lateral and vertical position of manned aircraft at time of visual encounter. Green
plots indicate path of aircraft post-sighting.
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Table 4
UAS Detection Range by Flight & Intercept
Intercept
UAS Maneuver

Aspect
UAS Type

2
Hover
Port
Iris

Flight
#1
#2

3
Hover
Port
Iris

4
Transition
Port>Starboard
Iris

5
Transition
Port>Starboard
Iris

0.39

6
Orbit
Head-on
Anaconda
0.22

0.17

0.72

#3

0.98

#4

0.08

0.15

0.49

#5

0.31

0.07

0.16

#6

0.08

0.06

#7
#8

0.34*

#9
#10

0.09

#11

0.08*

0.19*

0.07

0.05

0.10

0.79

0.21*

0.07
No Data**

0.14
0.13

0.07

0.19

#12

0.11

0.19

0.09

0.26

#13

0.13

0.12

0.11

0.26

#14

0.61

#15
#16
#17
#18

0.13
0.13

0.09

0.28

0.45
0.18

0.15

0.86
0.13

0.78

#19

1.36

#20

1.17

*Flown with Anaconda fixed-wing UAS, rather than Iris Quadcopter; data excluded from certain
calculations; **Crew sighted UAS, however, no telemetry data was collected (excluded from data
calculations); [Note: All ranges in statute miles (SM). Blank fields indicate UAS was not spotted
during intercept]
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Pilot Distance Estimation
Immediately following each intercept, participants estimated the distance
between the aircraft and UAS platform. Researchers collected 47 pilot distance
estimates and compared the estimates to the tracked GPS distances to determine
estimation error. Pilot estimates varied from 0 ft [imminent collision/collision] to
1.59 SM. This data is reflected in Table 5.
Table 5
UAS Detection Range Pilot Estimate Differentials by Intercept & Flight
2
3
4
5
6
Flt Act Est ∆
Act Est ∆
Act Est ∆
Act Est ∆
Act Est ∆
.39
.50
-.11
.22
0
.22
1
.17
.25
-.08
.72
.50
.22
2
.98
1.50 -.52
3
.08
.04
.04
.15
.095 .06
.49
.095 .40
4
.31
.25
.06
.07
.25
-.18
.16
.25
-.09
5
.08
1.0
-.92
.06
1.0
-.94
6
.10
.125 -.03 .79
.25
.54
7
-1.21
-1.59
.34
.25
.09
.08
.125 -.05 .19
1.4
.21
1.8
.07
.095 -.03
8
.07
.057 .01
.05
.047 0
N/A .152 N/A
9
.09
0
.14
.076 .06
10 .09
.13
.057 .07
.07
.019 .05
.19
0
.19
11
.25
-.14 .19
.75
-.56 .09
.25
-.16
.26
.25
.01
12 .11
.08
.05
.12
.19
-.07 .11
.057 .05
.26
.114 .15
13 .13
.61
.379 .23
14
.13
.057 .07
.09
.028 .06
.45
.076 .37
15
N/A N/A .28
.75
-.47
.18
.5
-.32
16 .13
.15
.19
-.04
.86
.095 .77
17
.13
.038 .09
.78
N/A N/A
18
1.36 1.0
.36
19
1.17 .25
.92
20
Note: (Act = Actual UAS Distance; Est = Pilot Estimated UAS Distance; ∆ = Difference between
Act & Est distance/pilot estimation error). Lack of data available to perform calculation or no
pilot distance estimate indicated by “N/A” in dataset. All distances presented in statute miles
(SM). Positive numbers in the delta column indicate the pilot underestimated the actual distance
between the UAS and aircraft; Negative numbers in the delta column indicate the pilot
overestimated the actual distance.

Table 5 shows each flight, organized by intercept passes 2-6. The table
contains the manned aircraft’s GPS-measured distance from the UAS at the time of
sighting, followed by the pilot’s distance estimate, and the overall difference.
Distance estimates for the Anaconda deviated by an average of 0.25 statute miles
from the actual UAS distance: distance estimates for the Iis deviated by 0.20 statute
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mile. Generally, pilots tended to overestimate their distance to the smaller Iris UAS
and underestimate distances to the larger Anaconda UAS.
Visual Data
The externally mounted GoPro electro-optical camera provided several
video and still images of the intercepts. Researchers selected a representative
sample of the images to include in this report for illustrative purposes.
During the experiment, the experimental aircraft encountered a largewinged bird, believed to be a turkey vulture. Presented in Figure 6, this image
provides a convenient comparison between a pilot’s visual depictions of a bird
encounter vs. an encounter with a similarly sized Anaconda UAS platform, such as
the one presented in Figure 7. Figure 8 shows another encounter with the Anaconda
UAS, estimated at 0.5 SM. At further distances, it appears that the only visible
discernable portion of the UAS is the large wingspan. Figure 9 depicts the small
Iris platform operating at relatively low-level transition to landing. The platform
shows up as an almost indiscernible white speck in the photograph.
Visual contrast between the UAS and surface vegetation clearly has an
impact on visibility. It is fairly easy to discern both the flying bird and Anaconda
UAS in both Figures 6 and 7, as they are both presented against a reasonably
homogeneous surface background. Conversely, the UAS craft presented in Figures
8 and 9 show how difficult it can be to detect and discern a UAS against a complex,
heterogeneous background.
Qualitative Data
The observations of the safety observer and recorded participant comments
were collected and analyzed for common themes. Five common themes emerged
from the qualitative data:
Size estimation error. Many participants were surprised to learn the actual
size of the fixed wing Anaconda platform. Most participants underestimated the
size as a 2-3 foot wingspan craft [actual wingspan was 6.75 feet]. As previously
mentioned, participants also underestimated the distance to the Anaconda platform.
Since participants were not shown the platforms in advance of the experiment, this
finding may help to explain the distance estimation error. Personal assumptions of
the UAS size may influence the distance perception.
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Figure 6. Visible bird encounter (Turkey Vulture).

Parallax error. Parallax error describes how an object, when perceived
from the observer’s position demonstrates an apparent displacement from its actual
location. Despite the experimental pilots being aware of the positive vertical
separation engineered into the experiment, several participants reported still
perceiving the UAS to be in such proximity that they felt a collision was imminent.
One participant even performed an evasive climbing maneuver to avoid the UAS.
This finding seems to indicate that pilots experienced a form of parallax illusion in
the vertical plane.
Reaction time estimation error. Contrary to the telemetry data, most
participants reported they could avoid a UAS collision. This observation was
reflected in the comment of Participant 18 who stated, “passes where UAVs were
spotted [we] had ample time to avoid a collision.”
Limited scanning width. The safety observer noted that Participants 19
and 20 were not scanning the full range of visibility. Participants primarily scanned
between the 11:00-2:00 positions. The safety observer also noted that a tendency
of the participants was to look almost straight down rather than just below the
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window level to observe the UAS craft. The safety observer noted that in these
cases the UAS was actually flying higher than the angle the pilots were scanning
Fixed-wing platform readily identifiable. Participants indicated the fixedwing Anaconda platform was much easier to spot than the Iris quadcopter.
Participant 14 remarked, “was able to see fixed wing aircraft straight
away…vehicle was coming at the manned aircraft and initiating a turn
underneath…the size and movement of the UAV made a difference.” Additional
comments recorded by the safety observer reflected this sentiment. Participants 1
and 3 both indicated the Anaconda became visible after the platform maneuvered,
producing a visible “wing-flash.”
Color scheme matters. While not specifically studied during the
experiment, 16 participants indicated that the white color of the UAS platforms
aided in their detection. Conversely, Participants 3 and 5 thought the white color
made the UAS more difficult to spot. Participant 2 commented that the “white color
made it [UAS] a little easier to spot.” Participant 8 echoed the observation stating,
“the white color helped make it [UAS] stand out.”
Comparable or more difficult to detect than birds. Ten participants
reported that the UAS craft was more difficult to detect than birds. Seven
participants reported detecting the UAS craft was comparable to spotting birds.
Participant 5 commented, “The white color blended with the background and was
harder to see, very similar to seeing birds…at first I thought the UAV could have
been a bird.”
Conclusions
Research Question 1
What is the mean distance in which an aware pilot can reliably visually detect a
converging sUAS platform under visual meteorological conditions?
The results do not support clear conclusions to this research question.
Seemingly, UAS platforms with a small visual surface area are extremely difficult
to detect. Quadcopter platforms like the Iris and comparable, popular DJI Phantom
series are not likely to be seen by pilots until within 0.10 SM. Even inside this
range, detection varies considerably between 26.3% and 57.9%. Larger platforms
such as the Anaconda are much easier to detect, with detection rates reaching 84.2%
and a mean detection distance of 0.493 SM. It is likely that this higher detectability
and longer detection range is partially due to the larger UAS platform visual surface
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area, and in part due to the head-on intercept type. Further research is required to
determine the exact reason for this substantial difference in detection range.
Research Question 2
Is there a substantial difference in detectability of fixed-wing vs. quadcopter UAS
platforms?
The data did not conform to normality requirements to perform a valid
correlated t-test to parametrically determine significant differences between
detection of fixed-wing and quadcopter platforms. Moreover, several data points
would need to be excluded from the data such as Flight 8 in which all passes were
flown with the Anaconda and Flight 9 in which no telemetry data was recorded for
the fixed-wing platform. Additionally, long-distance sightings of the Anaconda in
intercept 6 would have to be removed as outliers to preserve test integrity. As a
result, the researchers did not elect to perform data transformation or conduct nonparametric testing. The authors recommend statistical analysis of the data after
conducting further iterations of the experiment to collect additional data points.

Figure 7. Visible overhead encounter of fixed-wing Anaconda UAS.
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Figure 8. Visible encounter of fixed-wing Anaconda UAS

Figure 9. Visible encounter of Iris quadcopter UAS.
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In this instance, however, the descriptive statistics clearly indicates a
notable difference in detectability between the Iris quadcopter and fixed-wing
Anaconda platforms. The Anaconda’s mean detection distance of 0.493 SM far
exceeded that of the Iris platform, by more than 500%. As discussed in the previous
research question, it is likely that this variability is in part due to the difference in
platform surface area, and partially due to the differences in intercept aspect.
Additionally, fixed-wing UAS platforms seem to become more visible when
maneuvering, since the large surface area of the wing becomes exposed producing
a recognizable wing flash to searching pilots.
Research Question 3
Is there variability between a pilot’s perceived visual distance from a UAS and
their actual distance?
The data shows that pilots generally underestimated their distance to the
large Anaconda UAS by 0.25 SM. Pilots overestimated their distances to the small
Iris UAS by a mean distance of 0.20 SM. This finding is significant. Small
platforms make up the vast majority of hobby platforms and many commercial
operations, as well. If the finding is broadly true, pilots that visually spot such small
UAS platforms in flight are likely to assume they have more distance and
subsequent reaction time to respond before a potential collision. This problem may
be further complicated by the fact that small UAS platforms like the Iris are already
difficult to detect.

Research Question 4
Based on the FAA’s model for Aircraft Identification & Reaction Time, would
pilots have adequate time to evade a UAS collision?
According to the FAA’s Aircraft Identification and Reaction Time model
presented in Table 1, pilots require at least 12.5 seconds to detect, process, and
perform required evasive maneuvers to avoid an airborne collision threat. Based on
the mean detectability distances demonstrated by the participants in this study,
0.493 SM for the Anaconda and less than 0.10 SM for the Iris, the researchers
reverse-applied a conservative general aviation cruise speed of 100 knots to
estimate available reaction times to each platform.
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The simple equation of Time = Distance / Speed, yielded the following results:
Table 6
Available Reaction Time to a sUAS Collision Threat Based on Visibility Distance
Platform

Detection
Speed
Available Reaction
Distance
Time
Anaconda
0.493 SM
115.08mph (100 kts)
15.42 seconds
Iris
0.10 SM
115.08mph (100 kts)
3.12 seconds
Note: This estimation assumes the UAS platform is stationary and the convergence speed is
limited to the cruise speed of the aircraft.

Based on this estimate, a pilot would likely have adequate time to recognize
and respond to a larger fixed-wing platform like the Anaconda, but would be
unlikely to have adequate time to recognize and respond to a smaller platform like
the Iris.
Researcher Comments
It is important to note that the results of this experiment are based on the
most ideal of conditions. First, each pilot was made acutely aware of the presence
of UAS operations. These results may not represent realistic distributions of a
pilot’s divided attention between external scanning and internal flight deck
workload. Alert pilots are likely to divert increased attention to see-and-avoid
scanning than during normal flight operations. Additionally, this experiment was
conducted under clear, daytime, visual meteorological conditions. UAS
detectability and visual range are not likely to be valid when a pilot encounters
visually-hindering conditions such fog, mist, haze, snow, or other similar
phenomenon. Succinctly, the researchers believe the results presented in this study
represent the most optimistic visibility conditions that may not necessarily be
reflective of normal operations in the National Airspace System.
Recommendations
The researchers recommend the following operational considerations when
flying in proximity to unmanned aircraft:
Full-range scanning. Full-range scanning is critical to ensuring safety in
the visual environment. The authors recommend employing the scanning
procedures and concepts outlined by the FAA in Advisory Circular, AC 90-48D,
Pilots’ Role in Collision Avoidance.
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Enlist others to assist in UAS detection. Enlist the aid of other
crewmembers or passengers to assist in UAS visual detection by putting more eyes
on more sky, particularly in areas proximate to UAS operations.
Realize the limitations of vision. It is important to understand the physical
limitations of vision as a mechanism of collision detection. Visual illusions such as
the aforementioned parallax error and size estimation error can lead to poor
aeronautical decision-making regarding UAS avoidance and evasion. Pilots should
check NOTAMs for UAS flight activity, monitor ATC frequencies for traffic alerts,
and exercise a vigilant visual scanning pattern to ensure early awareness to a
potential UAS encounter or collision threat.
Do not delay evasion. The study results indicate pilots are consistently poor
at estimating UAS distance. The authors recommend pilots actively maneuver to
avoid or evade close encounters with UAS platforms, provided the maneuver can
be performed without compromising flight safety.
Suggestions for Further Research
The authors recommend repeating this study to gather additional data points
for statistical analysis. Furthermore, the authors recommend the creation of spinoff research projects to include analysis on the visibility of UAS lighting and night
operations, UAS markings, and color contrast. Finally, the authors recommend
additional testing of the proprietary uAvionix ADS-B system to determine the
viability, effectiveness, and reliability of large-scale use.
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